Mercer Law Review
Volume 27
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 26

12-1975

Public Utilities--Consumers Lack Standing to Obtain Review of
Reasonableness of Approved Rates
G. Neil Skene Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr

Recommended Citation
Skene, G. Neil Jr. (1975) "Public Utilities--Consumers Lack Standing to Obtain Review of Reasonableness
of Approved Rates," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 27 : No. 1 , Article 26.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol27/iss1/26

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

PUBLIC UTILITIES-CONSUMERS LACK
STANDING TO OBTAIN REVIEW OF
REASONABLENESS OF APPROVED RATES
The Georgia Supreme Court, in Georgia Power Co. v. Allied Chemical
Corp.,' held that consumers lack standing to obtain judicial review of a
utility rate increase approved by the Georgia Public Service Commission
(PSC) when their attack is based on an allegation that the new rates are
unreasonably high. Public utilities, of course, still have their traditional
equitable challenge of rates that are unreasonably low, but the court said
a statutory grant of review is necessary for consumers to challenge rates
that are unreasonably high.
The consumers' suit arose in the Fulton County Superior Court after the
PSC authorized Georgia Power to raise its electric rates to bring in new
revenues of approximately $67.9 million.' The plaintiffs, primarily a group
of industrial firms,3 alleged that the increase was unjustly and unreasonably high, in violation of the state and federal constitutions and the statutes
of Georgia. Objecting that its customers could not challenge the rates in
court, Georgia Power moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. The trial court denied the motion but certified the issue of standing for immediate interlocutory appeal to the supreme court. Reversing the lower court, the supreme court expressly disapproved a 56-year-old precedent established in City of Atlanta v. Atlanta
Gas-Light Co.,' in which a consumer challenge of gas rates was decided
unfavorably on the merits.5
1. 233 Ga. 558, 212 S.E.2d 628 (1975).
2. PSC Doc. No. 2536-U (Dec. 13, 1973).
3. Allied Chemical Corp. was first in the alphabetical listing. "Allied Chemical" and "the
industrial group" will be used interchangeably in this note to refer to the entire group of
plaintiffs-appellees. Both the plaintiffs and defendants were ironically aligned. Intervening
as plaintiffs with the industrial firms were an AFL-CIO organization, the Atlanta Labor
Council, and an activist consumer group, the Georgia Power Project. None of these were
mentioned by the supreme court in its opinion. The defendants were the PSC and Georgia
Power Co.-the regulators and the regulated. The PSC, however, did not participate in this
appeal.
4. 149 Ga. 405, 100 S.E. 439 (1919).
5. Standing has been linked by the U.S. Supreme Court with the presence of a "legally
protected interest." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). The Georgia Supreme Court used
essentially the same meaning, 233 Ga. at 560, 212 S.E.2d at 631, quoting Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). However, the court stated its holding in
terms of "justiciability" normally connected with the "political question" doctrine, related
to but distinct from standing: "[W]e rule today that ...
this suit must fail because . . .
[it] presents an issue which is non-justiciable because it has been entrusted solely to the
legislature, a coordinate branch of government." 233 Ga. at 561-62, 212 S.E.2d at 631-32.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), which gives the best explanation of the "political
question" doctrine in federal courts, links a "political question" with, among several possible
situations, "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department." Id. at 217.
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Regulation of public utilities is an exercise of a state's police power.'
Under common law, enforcement of "reasonable" rates charged by public
businesses was left to the courts - a practice that continued in the United
States into the 1800's.7 Direct legislative acts establishing maximum rates
and, later, delegation of the rate-making power to commissions gradually
took the primary jurisdiction away from the courts.' Such statutory regulation was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in 1877 in Munn v.
Illinois' in which the Court said a person whose enterprise was "clothed
with a public interest" was subject to control "by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created." 10
In 1890 the Supreme Court first faced the issue of a utility's right to
challenge regulated rates specifically, rather than regulation generally, on
the ground that its property was unconstitutionally confiscated. Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry.v. Minnesota" arose after the Minnesota utilities commission set maximum rates for railroad transportation. In this
challenge of those rates by the railroad, the Minnesota Supreme Court said
the statute establishing 'the commission had made commission decisions
"final and conclusive" and therefore not subject to judicial review. Given
that interpretation of the statute, the United States Supreme Court held
it was unconstitutional. The Court said a company unable to charge a
"reasonable" rate for the use of its property "is deprived of the lawful use
of its property, and thus, in substance and effect, of the property itself
.'. '1 Having joined the majority in establishing utilities' right to seek
judicial review of rate decisions, Justice Miller, in a concurring opinion,
also expressed his belief that consumers have the same right. Rates, he
said, could not be
so unreasonable as to practically destroy the value of property of
[utilities] .. .nor so exorbitant and extravagant as to be in utter disregard of the rights of the public for the use of such [utilities] . . . . In
either of these classes of cases there is an ultimate remedy by the parties
aggrieved, in the courts, for relief against such oppressive legislation
13

6. M. FAIRIS & R. SAMPSON, PUBLIC UTILITIES: REGULATION, MANAGEMENT, AND OWNERSHIP
6 (1973). Exercise of the police power by a legislative body is subject only to constitutional
limitations. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). So the "legally protected interest" allegedly infringed by an exercise of the police power must be a constitutionallyprotected
interest. See 233 Ga. at 560-61, 212 S.E.2d at 631.
7. FARRIS & SAMPSON, supra note 6 at 60-61.
8. Id. at 61. The book has a general discussion of the development of utility regulation at
pages 6-17 and 60-66.
9. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
10. Id. at 126. The Court also said regulation normally would not conflict with the relatively new fourteenth amendment.
11. 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
12. Id.at 458.
13. Id. at 459-60 (Miller, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

19751

NOTES

The Court has never directly faced the point raised by Justice Miller,
although it has demonstrated that it is not inclined to adopt his position."
Not until 1894 did the Court involve itself in the intricacies of ratemaking to determine whether a particular rate was confiscatory. Having
rejected one case for lack of a "case or controversy," 5 the Court, in Reagan
v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,'" affirmed a Texas court's injunction against
the utility commission's enforcing rates the commission had established.
In doing so, the Supreme Court examined the financial records of the
railroad and found that revenues under the new rates would not permit
payment of interest on the railroad's debt - much less provide a return
on the stockholders' investment. The Court said the allegation, supported
by the evidence available in Reagan, that a tariff is "unjust and unreasonable," provides a proper ground for judicial review."
Since the industrial group in Allied Chemical alleged that Georgia
Power's new rates were "unjust and unreasonable," the use of the words
in Reagan and Minnesota might indicate support for the industrial group's
position. However, the Georgia Supreme Court flatly stated in Southern
Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Georgia Public Service Commission:'5
"Rates that are unjustly or unreasonably low are confiscatory." Later, in
Georgia Power Co. v. Georgia Public Service Commission," the court said
a PSC standard for determining a "zone of reasonableness" for rates would
give the courts a "basis for reviewing a rate authorized by a commission
in order to determine whether such rates was constitutionally confiscatory." Thus a rate "unreasonably low" was held to violate a constitutional
standard and give utilities standing in equity.
Although Georgia had established its own regulatory system by 1880,1
14. See Wright v. Cent. Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 297 U.S. 537 (1936), in which the
Court held that consumers of natural gas had no vested rights in impounded funds that were
a part of a temporary rate set by the regulatory commission and held pending a final determination of whether the rates were excessive. See also Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877).
15. In 1892 the Court, in Chicago & G.T. Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339 (1892), considered
a utility challenge of rates alleged to be confiscatory but rejected the contention on the ground
that the suit was too "friendly." The customer and the railway apparently had planned the
actions that led to the suit and had stipulated so many facts that the Court said there was
no real controversy.
16. 154 U.S. 362 (1894). See also Wadley S. Ry. v. Georgia, 235 U.S. 651 (1915), a prominent confiscation case from Georgia.
17. 154 U.S. at 412-13.
18. 203 Ga. 832, 872, 49 S.E.2d 38, 63 (1948). The same conclusion was drawn in Federal
Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942) and in St. Joseph Stock
Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936), cited in Georgia Power Co. v. Allied Chem.
Corp., 233 Ga. 558, 559, 566-67, 212 S.E.2d 628, 630, 634 (1975).
19. 231 Ga. 339, 201' S.E.2d 423 (1973).
20. Id. at 342, 212 S.E.2d at 426. What undoubtedly is a clerical error confuses the matter
somewhat, though. The opinion said the rate order "lies within that 'area of unreasonableness' which is barely above the point of being confiscation." Id. at 344, 201 S.E.2d at 427
(emphasis added). The court in Allied Chemical, however, cited the case to support the
synonymous meanings. 233 Ga. at 566, 212 S.E.2d at 634.
21. The state constitution of 1877, art. IV, §2, 1, gave the General Assembly the power
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the state supreme court did not overturn rates set by the PSC until
Southern Bell in 1948. However, 29 years earlier in City of Atlanta v.
Atlanta Gas Light Co.,2 customers of Atlanta Gas Light had gone to court
to seek a reversal of rates they alleged were too high. The issue of standing
was never raised, and the court considered the case on its merits. Despite
the decision that the consumers had failed to sustain their burden of proof
in showing that the rates were invalid, 3 the fact that the merits were
reached suggests that consumers were thought to have standing to bring a
suit to enjoin rates alleged to be unreasonably high.
It seems unlikely that a review of rates alleged to be unreasonably high
would require a trial more complicated than one required in a review of
rates alleged to be unreasonably low. Nevertheless, the complexity of a
consumer appeal worried the court as it pondered the Allied Chemical case
in light of its recent decision in Georgia Public Service Commission v.
General Telephone Co. of the Southeast,2 4 which established judicial review of PSC orders as de novo proceedings.2 ' Justice Hill, concurring in
Allied Chemical, said he preferred to overrule General Telephone and
2
thereby restrict the trial courts to evidence heard by the PSC.
'
The majority relied on more than fears of complexity, however. It considered Georgia's Administrative Procedure Act (APA)7 and the PSC statutes 8 and found that Georgia law does not grant judicial review to consumers. 21 The court also found support for its holding in basic theories of
regulation by commission. Public Service Commissioners are elected by
the people to prevent excessive rates for utility services;1° to allow those
who elected them to appeal their decisions to the courts would "imply a
to regulate "railroad freights and passenger tariffs." In 1879 the General Assembly created
the Railroad Commission. Ga. Laws, 1878-79, p. 125. In Georgia R.R. v. Smith, 70 Ga. 694
(1883), the court upheld the constitutionality of the commission and its rule-making powers,
and in Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Smith, 128 U.S. 174 (1888), the Supreme Court upheld
both the system and an order lowering rates.
22. 149 Ga. 405, 100 S.E. 439 (1919).
23. Id. at 410, 100 S.E. at 442. Also see Louisville & N. R.R. v. Georgia Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 222 Ga. 332, 149 S.E.2d 681 (1966), in which the court reaffirmed the presumption
that PSC orders are valid.
24. 227 Ga. 727, 182 S.E.2d 793 (1971). In this case the court allowed the utility, in a suit
to enjoin rates, to use data on finances not presented for consideration by the PSC, even on
a petition for reconsideration. The PSC argued, and Justice Felton in his dissent agreed, that
the utility had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Using the new evidence, the
superior court declared the rates confiscatory.
25. Essentially the same result had been reached in Georgia Power & Light Co. v. Georgia
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 8 F. Supp. 603 (N.D. Ga. 1934).
26. 233 Ga. at 568, 212 S.E.2d at 635 (Hill, J., concurring).
27. GA. CODE ANN. §3A-101 et seq. (Rev. 1975). The APA expressly excludes the PSC from
the list of agencies subject to judicial review. GA. CODE ANN. §3A-102(a) (Rev. 1975).
28. GA. CODE ANN. §93-101 et seq. (Rev. 1972). "The power to determine what are just
and reasonable rates and charges is vested exclusively in the Public Service Commission
.... " GA. CODE ANN. §93-309 (Rev. 1972) (emphasis added).
29. 233 Ga. at 560, 212 S.E.2d at 631.
30. See GA. CODE ANN. §§93-201 and 93-310 (Rev. 1972).
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lack of trust on the part of the Judiciary in the political process." 3 The
only other possibility for the consumers, then, would be to challenge the
constitutionality of the PSC order. The majority, however, said without
much elaboration that the consumers could not have been deprived of
property without due process because there was no vested property right
of which they could be deprived." The majority also interpreted a constitutional provision requiring the General Assembly to prohibit "other than
,,.not to mean "that any utility rate order
just and reasonable rates .
is subject to generalized grievances . . .,.
Georgia's highest court is by no means the first to reach the conclusion
that consumers lack standing to challenge the reasonableness of rates established by utilities commissions. In the leading case of Brooklyn Union
Gas Co. v. City of New York,3 the New York court, faced with a consumer
attack on rates alleged to be unreasonably high, explained that the right
to reasonable rates was both a common law and a statutory right but was
not a vested property right. To be vested and thus free from legislative
interference, the court said, a right must be "something more than such a
mere expectation as may be based upon an anticipated continuation of the
present general law. ' 3 The court also said a consumer, unlike a utility,
"has no capital invested which would be destroyed by the exaction of an
unreasonable rate" 37 and is under no legal obligation to buy, despite the
"pressure of circumstances [which] might operate almost as strongly as
Other state courts that have considered the
a legal obligation . . . . ,,3"
29
issue of standing in the absence of statutes have reached the same result.
There were two dissents in Allied Chemical, and each asserted a differ31. 233 Ga. at 563, 212 S.E.2d at 632.
32. Id.at 561, 212 S.E.2d at 631. This is one of several references, albeit indirect, to the
"political question" doctrine. See note 5, supra. Cases not justiciable under the "political
question" doctrine also include those involving "the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
33. GA.CONST. art. IV, §1, 1; GA. CODE ANN. §2-2401 (Rev. 1973).
34. 233 Ga. at 565, 212 S.E.2d at 633.
35. 50 Misc. 450, 100 N.Y.S. 570 (1906), aff'd, 115 App. Div. 69, 100 N.Y.S. 625, aff'd,
188 N.Y. 334, 81 N.E. 141 (1907). A later New York case, Lakeland Water Dist. v. Onondaga
Co. Water Auth., 24 N.Y.2d 400, 248 N.E.2d 855, 301 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1969), said consumers could
challenge utility rates, but the court's principal concern was the form of action, and the
recognized constitutional ground of discrimination seemed to be a consideration in the appeal.
36. __ Misc. __, 100 N.Y.S. at 577.

37. Id.
38. Id.
City of Birmingham v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 234 Ala. 526, 176 So.
39. See, e.g.,
301 (1937); St. Paul Book & Stationery Co. v. St. Paul Gaslight Co., 130 Minn. 71, 153 N.W.
262 (1915); State v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 54 N.M. 315, 224 P.2d 155 (1950). In
St. Paul, cited particularly by the Allied Chemical majority, the court was "not strongly
impressed" with the idea that consumers could simply do without the utility service but
based its decision on the practical effect of removing stability from rate decisions of commissions.
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ent ground for providing consumers with the remedy already provided to
utilities. Justice Ingram said consumers might show that they have an
investment which would be useless if electricity were unavailable and that,
because of the utility's monopoly position, they must buy electricity "from
the defendant at a rate which is so unreasonably high and unjust that in
practical terms it is confiscatory. 44 Justice Gunter pointed to the state's
constitutional requirement that the General Assembly see that "just and
reasonable rates" prevail' and to the vesting of the PSC with duties "not
inconsistent with other provisions of this Constitution. 4 2 Justice Gunter
said the provisions, unique to Georgia, established a new class of "constitutional extortion cases" that may be brought by consumers just as utilities
may bring "constitutional confiscation" cases.4 3 Having taken the position
directly contrary to that of Justice Ingram, 41 the majority dismissed Justice
45
Gunter's interpretation of the constitution as a "novel contention.
A different result in Allied Chemical would have marked a break from
the line of foreign jurisdiction cases dating from 1919. However, Justice
Hall's majority opinion did not sufficiently rebut any of the principal
arguments raised in the three separate opinions. The majority did not
explain why the trial court's "review" must be a de novo proceeding. It
avoided explaining why the state constitution requires that rates be "just
and reasonable" if that is not a constitutional standard, as Justice Gunter
suggested. Furthermore, despite the fact that industrial firms with technologies very reliant on electricity were the principal figures in this suit,
the majority did not explain why their investments were not vested property rights that might be injured or destroyed by excessive electric rates,
as Justice Ingram suggested. The majority did recite the compelling argument that decisions by elected officials on what is "reasonable" for the
public welfare should not be reviewed by the courts.
In Allied Chemical, industrial firms, which often limit their rate challenges to an effort to shift the increase to another class of customers,
brought their financial resources to the side of consumers, only to be closed
out by the courts. As the majority pointed out, voters may be able to
change rate decisions by throwing out PSC incumbents. But the solution
to the unfairness and frustration that results from this decision on standing
is now in the hands of the General Assembly.
G.

NEIL SKENE JR.

40. 233 Ga. at 572-73, 212 S.E.2d at 637 (Ingram, J., dissenting).
41. GA. CONST. art. IV, §1, 1; GA. CODE ANN. §2-2401 (Rev. 1973).
42. GA. CONST. art. IV, §4, 3; GA. CODE ANN. §2-2703 (Rev. 1973).
43. 233 Ga. at 571, 212 S.E.2d at 637 (Gunter, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 561, 212 S.E.2d at 631.
45. Id. at 565, 212 S.E.2d at 633. The majority also argued that some rather inconclusive
statements from legislative history supported its view that regulation is a policy matter.

